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THE

ACLS

NEWSLETTER

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES
A MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ACADEMIES

VOLUME III

WINTER 1952

NUMBER 1

Duke University Library
Contents
MAR 15 1952

Learning, the Study of Man

ANNUAL REPORT

to the

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES

by

Charles E. Odegaard, Executive Director

January 23, 1952

1219 SIXTEENTH STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

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Learning, the Study of Man

WE are all familiar with the tradition by which the President of the United States attempts to summarize his view of the "State of the Union" for the benefit of Congress as it convenes again in the month of January. In proposing to follow this precedent in another though not unrelated sphere, I shall attempt to summarize certain aspects of the state of learning as a prelude to comments about the state of the American Council of Learned Societies.

This is a large assignment to encompass within a brief and bearable report; but it is restricted to some extent by a conscious adoption of a limited meaning to the word "learning," the conventional meaning, in fact, which the founders of the Council had in mind back in 1919 when they chose as the title for the new organization, the "American Council of Learned Societies Devoted to Humanistic Studies." No one would deny that students of the natural order are learned men; but the habit had long since developed of dividing the realms of knowledge into two great divisions called respectively "Science" and "Learning." It was the narrower meaning of "Learning" which the founders of the Council had in mind when they chose as the distinguishing word for the societies brought into the Council the adjective "Learned," confirming their intent by adding devotion to "Humanistic Studies." There was no need for them to consider scientific societies, for the fever of war had already induced the creation first, during the Civil War, of the National Academy of Sciences, and then, on the eve of World War I, of the Academy's administrative pendant, the National Research Council. The founders of the ACLS were attempting rather to fill in a large gap in the scholarly organization of the United States by creating a national organization comparable in purpose if not in form to the organization already in existence for Science.

Thus, the "Learning" to which this new Council was dedicated was "Humanistic Studies," as the founders then construed them—the study of man in contradistinction to the study of nature. There are, to be sure, some

This issue of the ACLS NEWSLETTER, the first of four issues to be published during 1952, is devoted exclusively to the annual report of the Executive Director. The next issue of the NEWSLETTER, scheduled for distribution around April 1, will contain the usual miscellaneous articles.

fuzzy lines even here in this gross distinction between Science and Learning, between Science and Humanistic Studies, for scientific investigation is itself a philosophical enterprise encouraged by a particular constellation of human values embedded in society, and man is an animal form, and human behavior has a biological base. These refinements, however, in practical terms are presently of so little substance as to provide no cushion against the blow when humanistic enterprise strikes the hard rock of the federal government's definition of research in the national interest as restricted to the natural sciences and of similar prejudices even among universities and foundations.

Though the founders of the ACLS left science to the care of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council, they contemplated no division within the broad area of the study of man. "Humanistic Studies" to them clearly embraced what have subsequently come to be called the "humanities" and the "social sciences," since the ten "disciplinary" societies which originally ratified the constitution of the ACLS would now be regarded as about equally divided between the two groups. The other two founding societies took all knowledge as their province but joined the ACLS as a means of serving their humanistic interests. From its very origin, the Council thus comprised in its constituent membership both humanistic and social science groups, and this wide coverage of the fields of the study of man has continued in the list of societies subsequently admitted to the Council.

Thirty-three years after the founding of the Council some individuals think that the study of man should best be divided into the humanities and the social sciences and suggest that the ACLS involves a marriage of parties which should best be kept asunder. No such idea was present in the minds of the generation of scholars who created the ACLS, and I personally believe the world of Learning has more to gain than to lose by keeping the company here assembled and by maintaining this association and this means of communication among humanists and social scientists, even while I recognize the importance of our later sister council, the Social Science Research Council, and the consequent limitation of the ACLS to a concern primarily with the humanities.

I can best suggest my reason for preferring to see maintained this bridge between so-called humanists and so-called social scientists by some comments on the state of the study of man. By this I mean, of course, the pattern of study of man as carried on by scholars in our colleges and universities and as represented by the scholarly disciplines. Scholars like to think of themselves as individualists driven in their investigations by their own intimate and personal curiosity. If this were a complete description of them, it would be very difficult to make any roughly valid generalizations about their way of conducting the study of man. But it is not a complete description of them. They have also accepted, like scientists, a large measure of discipline—self-

discipline to be sure, derived from an accumulating body of scholarly convention—with the result that there are established ways of pursuing the study of man so clearly defined as to constitute what might be called the technology of Learning. I cannot undertake today an elaborate presentation of this theme, but I will attempt to suggest certain features of it.

Though there are some uniformities in the world of Learning, one must not force this reference to the *pattern* of the study of man to the point where it implies the existence of a rationally ordered, coherent plan into which the several parts fit together into a neatly ordered whole. The most obvious characteristic of the study of man is indeed the way in which it is split in a disordered fashion among a variety of disciplines which have come into existence as a matter of historical accident but which are certainly not attributable to any logical plan. Some are fairly old as self-conscious, organized disciplines: for example, Greek and Latin languages and literatures, philosophy, law, and theology, arts and music, the last two being old as objects of professional interest but less firmly established in academic institutions. Other disciplines are the result of splintering from, or adding to, older disciplines, such as the modern languages and literatures added to those of Greece and Rome, history derived from literature, political science and economics derived from history, and psychology derived from philosophy. Still others are more independent creations like sociology and anthropology.

Each of the self-conscious disciplines devoted to the study of one or another facet of man, his activities, and his creations has had its pioneers and propagators, its inventors of improved methodology, its recognized high priests to set or maintain standards, its routines for developing trained adherents in the oncoming generation, its own sense of importance and dignity and, lamentably, its tendency to jealousy of other disciplines. These disciplines tend to live in isolation, despite the fact that they often deal with common materials, employ similar methods, and respond to more general fashions or ideas in the scholarly world. With each of the disciplines driven by its own inner dynamic, preserving its traditional content and purpose, organizing at the university level into departments, and at the national level into societies, it is no wonder that the whole study of man appears planless, that there is so little evidence still in the colleges and universities of a paramount concern with identifying better ways to achieve a rounded and full study of man.

I do not wish to be understood as suggesting that all these developments within the several disciplines are bad. I do propose that more efforts should be made than are being made to subsume the separate disciplines under a broader concept of the study of man which will restrain the separatistic tendency of the disciplines and at the same time recognize the contributions which each discipline is capable of making to the whole.

Some may interpose that we already have an outline of a planned approach in the division into Humanities and Social Sciences, each grouping being the basis in most college and university organization of a formally established Division of the Humanities and Division of Social Sciences. But the fact is that these divisions internally have little meaning apart from some collaboration at the level of general education courses. Each of the disciplines within the humanities is cultivated with little thought to what it may have in common with the others; and the same situation prevails generally for the social sciences, although there is some tendency to create for research purposes social science institutes or centers which may presage a larger measure of interdisciplinary interest among the social sciences.

Despite the fact that during the past thirty years the division of disciplines into the humanities and social sciences has become conventional in the scholarly world, there remain great difficulties in the application of these terms to fields of knowledge. In the first round of discussion, we might get fairly general agreement that the disciplines distribute themselves as follows: Social Sciences—Political Science, Economics, Geography, Psychology, Sociology, and Anthropology; Humanities—Languages, Literatures, Philosophy and Religion, Arts, and Music. But where does history (and its autonomous subdivision, archaeology) belong? And within the social sciences, how does one separate from the humanities cultural anthropology, the historical and theoretical aspects of political science and economics, and psychology's concern with aesthetics? So many aspects of the fields of the social sciences touch those of the humanities at so many points that the distinction between the two divisions as groupings of fields of study quickly breaks down on closer inspection. The attempt to assign these subject matter fields to one or the other division raises at least as many problems as it solves. Indeed, this convention seems to me to have intensified the separatistic tendency among the disciplines and to have increased the difficulties of communication among scholars. One thing we can do in our efforts to overcome this bad effect is to retain the bridge among the disciplines provided by the present pattern of association among the constituent societies of the ACLS.

But there may be a kind of validity, a meaning, to this distinction between humanities and social sciences which rests upon an awareness of certain differences not between groups of disciplines so much as between types of problems dealt with by humanists and social scientists and resultant expectations about these scholars. The most obvious distinction is the notion of *timeliness* of the work of the social scientist, the contemporaneity of his interests. Most people assume that the social scientist—for example, the political scientist, the economist, or the psychologist—is concerned directly with the here and now, with the contemporary scene; and so are led to assume—whether or not the assumption be valid—that these scholars are somehow

more "practical" than humanists. There is some justification for this view, insofar as contemporaneity is concerned, in that many practitioners in these disciplines (though by no means all) are, as social scientists, attempting to apply laboratory testing methods suggested by work in the natural sciences to social problems. The very methods they use, difficult of application though they are, are more easily applied to the living generation than to past generations. Polling techniques, attitude tests in response to standardized questions, case studies and controlled interviews, especially when statistical formulations are sought, are methods of research applicable only to live, human guinea pigs; and so the scholar who uses them naturally gives the appearance of concern with present men. This social scientist's approach to the study of man, involving by virtue of the methods used certain dexterities such as statistics, very properly attracts individuals with appropriate aptitudes and tends to develop a special type of scholar, more competent and more interested in his particular approach to the study of man than in the approach of the humanist.

In contrast, humanists seem preoccupied with the past. They seem to deal largely with what man has done, not with the immediate responses of live human beings to the researcher's questions but with what might be called objectified evidence of human experience, with an art object, or with the written words of a novel, a poem, a theological tractate, an historical chronicle, a letter, or legal documents which record an historical event sometime somewhere. Each of these objects when it comes to the humanist's hands for study is in a sense finished, completed, over, done with, perhaps in large part the work of persons no longer living. From all these types of object the humanist infers something about the human beings who are, as it were, in back of the object, who are seen through their imprint or representation upon the object. Obviously such objects may be used and are used for the study of living people, as for example, the poems of living writers, but other methods also may be used for direct analysis of the living poet's experience and intent. But the dead past—and whatever inferences he may draw from it about the present—tends to be the more special province of the humanist with his range of special skills required to deal with this objectified evidence for the simple reason that Charlemagne, Boso the Peasant, their contemporaries, their predecessors, and most of their successors down to men who died yesterday are not readily available to the "scientific" testing techniques of the social scientist.

There are considerable consequences to this time factor, the limitations it imposes upon the applicability of the social scientist's scientific techniques to much of the human past, and the necessity of relying upon the humanist's handling of evidence for much of what happened in the lives even of men who, in the mediaeval phrase, are both living and dead on this very day.

Some very important by-products stem from this difference in the time factor in the approaches to the study of man of the social scientist and the humanist.

The social scientist, applying his methods of research to live human beings and thinking in terms suggested by experiences in the natural sciences, tends to look for possibilities of prediction, to try to formulate hypotheses as to future human actions, and then to see how they actually work out under at least partially controlled conditions. There is an increasing expectation that this social science approach will produce "results" concerning social behavior of such a scientific—that is, certain—character as to make possible "social engineering," an application of social science for the control of men comparable in kind if not yet in degree to the engineer's application of basic science for the control of matter. Some of my social scientist acquaintances tend to develop a queazy expression on their faces at mention of this expectation, but it is a not unnatural consequence of a valid and honest attempt to design research on social behavior along lines which may give predictive results. This expectation is also resulting in an increased measure of moral and financial support for the social scientist, a silver lining to what appears to some social scientists as a dark cloud of dangerous responsibility.

The humanist, on the contrary, dealing less often with groups of live human beings under controllable conditions, tends to concern himself with a description of what happened rather than with a more readily verifiable prediction of what will happen. No such air of precision and accuracy attaches to his formulations as one may find in those of the social scientist, but in most instances no other type of formulation may be possible for the problem posed by the humanist, the methods of the social scientist being largely inapplicable.

If the social scientist tends to emphasize problems of prediction of social behavior, the humanist tends to have a greater interest in norms for human living. The social scientist, striving to deal with variables under controlled conditions and to observe the attendant human and social phenomena dispassionately, concentrates on a scientific description of the mechanisms of human society, on how changes can be effected. In his strenuous effort to disassociate his own intimate preferences from the observation of his human data, the social scientist has tended to shy away in his professional activity from value problems, from questions as to whether given changes in society would be good or bad, desirable or undesirable. As a social scientist he has often felt that the problem of goals or ends was an aside, an interruption, in the serious business of his intellectual craft. There is, to be sure, among social scientists an increasing interest in the problem of values; but the humanist has never felt as inhibited as the social scientist about this concern, about the analysis of ends to be espoused and served by human beings. Leafing through the pages of the past, seeing the different goals for human living which have been put forth in other times and places, experiencing through

the artistic, literary, and historical record of many generations the incessant conflicts in human experience over different goals, he is often led to raise the normative questions: What are the best choices? What are the preferred ends? Granted that he can rarely give a precise and certain answer, the humanist often brings to light even the hidden values which this and earlier generations have accepted for their lives and, in this respect, enables men the better to discern the value consequences of changes in society which the social scientist may know how to effect.

In yet another way the differences in approach of the humanist and of the social scientist lead to different emphases. The social scientist, applying his preferred methodologies to the kinds of questions appropriate to them, wipes out the visages of individuals in the search for types. He finds uniformities, similarities, probabilities, and there is no question as to the importance of many of his insights; but they tend to be abstractions about men produced at the expense of individuality. The humanist, however, by virtue of the kinds of materials he uses and the questions he can put to them, tends to deal with the individual. His subject matter usually carries the stamp of individual persons in place and time. Even when striving to generalize, he works largely through the particular; for example, in portraying Greek civilization, he sees it largely through an individual's experience, through a poem of Sappho, a history of Thucydides, a statue by a nameless artist. Since he deals almost inescapably with the individual, he inclines less toward the detection of valid abstractions about men in general and more toward an effort to integrate many elements into a whole which can be grasped only in individualized persons.

Please do not misunderstand me. In describing certain differences between the humanist and the social scientist, I am not trying to present a picture of the ideal humanist and of the ideal social scientist. I have attempted rather to distinguish in the humanities and social sciences two somewhat different tendencies in, or approaches to, the study of man, which suggest the use of different kinds of evidence acquired through somewhat different methodologies and which lead to different centers of interest, to different emphases.

In the terms suggested by these distinctions, the disciplines of the humanities are still largely the province of the humanist. It is equally apparent that the disciplines of the social sciences still embrace many scholars who would be hard put to establish that the nature of the problems they study and the methodologies they use are fundamentally different from those of the humanist. Despite their presence in so-called social science fields, they still function very much like humanists.

I imply by this statement neither praise nor blame, for I see no reason to regard either the social scientist's approach or the humanist's approach to the study of man as intrinsically better, one over the other, or as the proper

monopoly of any one discipline or set of disciplines. What impresses me is the importance of each approach and the degree to which they complement each other, each providing important contributions to the whole study of man. There is every indication that we must avoid any widening chasm between the protagonists of these two approaches if we would understand man. Above all, we must learn to see past and present in closer juxtaposition. The work of anthropologists has served to remind us how much of living man, the externalities of his social and material structure as well as his inner personality structure, is the product of his cultural inheritance; and findings of psychologists and psychiatrists concerning personality development and adjustment emphasize that if we would understand present behavior we must go back and back into the earlier family and cultural setting to detect the web which binds the generations in a close embrace. The historically-minded humanist has built his craft—and his career—largely on faith in the utility of the past to the knowledge of the present, and now the modernist is being forced by scientific discoveries to acknowledge the importance of the dead past to an understanding of the living present.

It is equally evident that we need a knowledge of means as well as of ends, of mechanisms and processes as well as of purposes and objectives, an awareness of uniformities as well as a recognition of the uniqueness of the individual.

Both approaches are patently required for a balanced, a whole, study of man. Ideally, they should be combined in the same scholar. This can sometimes happen, but we must recognize that proficiency in both approaches, especially of a kind to permit fundamental work in both, calls for such a wide range of skills that it is not easy for one and the same scholar to achieve a high order of competence in both. In any case, we should attempt to develop not merely a larger measure of toleration between humanists and social scientists, but rather an awareness of their mutual dependence if a respectable knowledge of man is to be achieved. Better yet, humanists and social scientists should be encouraged to be curious about each other and their work and to exchange readily the results of their inquiries and insights. Only when they recognize in daily associations their partnership in a common intellectual venture can our present fragmentary, disorderly, even faction-ridden study of man take on a more reasonable pattern which will give us all a better understanding of man in his wholeness.

Unfortunately, I see little evidence in the scholarly scene of strong influences at work tending to bring about any reciprocity between humanist and social scientist. Crude though the distinction be, the division into humanities and social sciences has settled upon the academic scene and, by becoming the basis for the machinery of university organization and, to a considerable extent, of foundation giving, has in none too subtle ways created a barrier

between scholars interested in the study of man. Individuals here and there transcend this barrier, and you will think of instances immediately; but the mass effect still remains, producing in both humanists and social scientists an insularity, a touch of contempt one for the other, which is a great blight on Learning.

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There is not only division in the world of Learning; there is also now a double standard. The advancement of Learning requires, in addition to the basic salaries of scholars gained largely through teaching in universities and colleges, supplemental funds to cover a variety of expenses incurred by the scholar in acquiring experiences essential to good teaching and research: fellowship support for training periods before reaching professional status in the academic world; subsequent periodic release from the confinement of teaching obligations to permit field work and archival investigation, or to provide time for intensive study or writing. To some extent these supplemental funds have come from the universities themselves, especially through sabbatical leaves, but changes in the cost of living have decreased their utility at a time when the difficulties of university financing are causing many institutions to limit the proportionate part of their funds which can be used for this purpose. A very important source of funds, especially for humanists and social scientists, has been the private foundations, some of their funds being disbursed directly to the individual scholar as in the Guggenheim fellowships, and others being disbursed through such intermediary agencies as the Social Science Research Council and the ACLS.

These two organizations have served during the last two decades as the national advocates for the supplemental needs of the social sciences and humanities. The present situation, however, is way out of balance. I think that it is a true statement that it is easier to obtain supplemental funds now for the social sciences than for the humanities. As Elbridge Sibley states in the Preface to his interesting report, *Support for Independent Scholarship and Research*, published by the SSRC in 1951: "Only cursory investigation is needed to document the fact that vastly greater financial support is currently given to research in some fields than in others. Even with respect to 'basic research' . . . it appears that as compared with academic scholars in the humanistic disciplines, those in the social sciences are subsidized four or five times as generously, and those in the natural sciences fourteen or fifteen times." Leaving aside the question of the natural sciences, it is obvious that there are now more opportunities available to social scientists through programs conducted by the SSRC than to humanists through programs conducted by the ACLS.

It is this situation which gave rise to a comment I heard recently, "The ACLS is apparently no longer interested in research in the humanities."

Nothing could be further from the truth. The Board of Directors does believe that the humanities are suffering in their relations with the generally educated public from an imbalance within scholarship itself, as stated in my article entitled "Research is *Not* Enough," published in the December 1950 issue of the *ACLS Newsletter*.

The Board of Directors believes that the experience of the humanist should be extended so that he will see his professional specialty in a broader perspective and be better able to interpret it to a non-professional audience. However, the Board also recognizes that the humanist has his own proper business and skills appropriate to that business which must be highly developed; and that there are times in the life of a scholar when his paramount need, if he is to be a productive and profound humanist, is an intensive experience when he should be the recipient of a fellowship for disciplinary training or of an "old-fashioned" grant-in-aid of research. If the ACLS does not have an impressive array of possibilities of this type for the benefit of the humanist, it is not because the ACLS does not believe in research in the humanities and does not wish to provide funds for research.

It is well to bear in mind what the ACLS is and what it is not. It is an interdisciplinary organization of responsible scholars concerned primarily with the encouragement of humanistic studies in America. In over thirty years of serving as an advocate of, and planner for, scholarly activity, it has gained a wealth of experience which enables it to develop professional judgment and advice concerning training programs and research projects in its area of interest. Scholars throughout the country are willing to give their time, imagination, and knowledge unstintingly as consultants without compensation. With their help, the Council's Board of Directors and staff identify various kinds of needs of scholars, formulate programs to meet important needs and objectives, and then, since the Council is not itself an endowed foundation, they must try to persuade sources of funds, primarily philanthropic foundations, to give their financial support. Thus programs actually conducted by the Council are based on requests for funds by the Board of Directors which have been acted upon favorably by foundations. It happens all too often that requests for what the Board of Directors considers to be well conceived and important programs are denied by sources of funds. Perhaps the world would have a more adequate basis on which to judge the leadership of councils and foundations if councils were to list in annual reports the requests to which they gave their moral backing but which were denied financial support by donors, and if foundations were to list in their annual reports, along with the grants made, a list of the proposals which were rejected.

As the general financial position of the humanities has deteriorated, so has that of the ACLS; and I must speak of its distress. As Henry V's Archbishop of Canterbury says:

"It must be so; for miracles are ceas'd;
And therefore we must needs admit the means
How things are perfected."

There still remains the possibility of some support for the short-term "packaged" project toward which the whole foundation system is predisposed, but the large-scale project requiring years for completion is now extremely difficult to finance as are the small-scale tools of implementation. Most crippling of all to the effectiveness of the Council is the hamstringing which comes from financial poverty at the nerve center of the Council, from inadequate central support on which ultimately all programs depend. The representational and planning services of the ACLS are—and should be—performed year in and year out. They are financially dependent upon a fund for administration and planning, year in and year out, if the services are to be performed. Admittedly this becomes a routine charge, lacking in novelty and carrying the presumption that the job will not be finished in a two or three year period. One can see why donors of funds are fearful of long-lasting commitments acquired by giving financial support for such purposes; but at the same time the recurrent nature of these financial needs should not be allowed to obscure the fact that recurrent services are being performed, by no means in a pedestrian routine but with a good deal of novelty involved as the Council meets from year to year new conditions and new problems.

We should recognize that a foundation official must have courage to recommend to his trustees the granting of funds to an agency such as the Council for activities which do not have a short-term character and which may lead to a similar request for support three years later. Those who are convinced of the value over many years of a national council such as the ACLS hope that there will continue to be foundation officials with the courage to recommend such grants and foundation trustees with the vision to see that a valuable purpose is served by recurrent grants for the support of an ongoing process of continuing stimulation and representation as well as by one-shot, easily terminable activities.

For reasons which are quite understandable, the trustees of foundations with large sums to dispense are more inclined to give funds for the recurrent needs of central support than trustees of smaller foundations. With smaller sums to spend, there is a strong inclination on the part of trustees to support a distinctive program in which they can take a large measure of personal interest and individual responsibility. They are, therefore, less disposed, regardless of the merits of the case, to take interest in a "middleman operation" involved in a grant to the ACLS for administration and planning. The Council can be grateful for an exception to this tendency in the case of the Bollingen Foundation which has given \$20,000 each year since 1947 for planning and general administration.

The Council has reason to be grateful to the Carnegie Corporation of New York for many years of substantial support, and I am glad to record here again the fruitful results of this association for the humanities and arts in America. In 1951 the Carnegie Corporation gave support to a special project, \$10,000 a year for three years, for summer study aids in linguistics. In recent years, however, the Carnegie Corporation has emphasized the social science disciplines and restricted its interest in the humanities and, consequently, in the ACLS, which does not now fill such a unique need with respect to the current program of the Corporation as to justify in the eyes of its officers continued annual support. In the light of this policy, the Corporation ceased in 1948 its support of the Council's grant-in-aid program and in 1951 awarded a terminal grant of \$37,500 for general support. Under these circumstances those interested in the humanities and the ACLS are left with no alternative except to hope that the Carnegie Corporation's constant review of its own program may lead in time to an orientation which again gives a larger place in the Corporation's program to the humanities and to the ACLS.

The greatest volume of support of the Council has come over the years from The Rockefeller Foundation. Officers of the Council have expressed frequently their appreciation for this long-continued support, and the Board of Directors was particularly gratified by the statement of the President of The Rockefeller Foundation:

"The ACLS has for long been and still is one of our primary concerns. We are indeed cognizant and proud of your record of achievements—also delighted beyond measure to note that the total contributions of the Rockefeller boards to you for various purposes now exceed \$3,300,000. What you have accomplished forms one of the finest chapters in the record of the humanities in the United States."

This statement prefaced an action which alters markedly the older situation with reference to support by The Rockefeller Foundation for administration, planning and fellowships. The Foundation is reducing support in this central area, so that the 1953-1954 level will be half that for 1951-1952. According to the latest Rockefeller Foundation report, "This reduction does not stem from any dissatisfaction with the work of the Council, but rather from the belief that, as the representative of humanistic scholarship in the United States, the Council should not be dependent on any single agency for so large a proportion of its support."

The Board of Directors is broadening the base of the Council's finances. During 1951 its activities received financial support from a larger number of sources than ever before in the Council's history: from six foundations (Rockefeller Foundation, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Edward W.

Hazen Foundation, Bollingen Foundation, John and Mary R. Markle Foundation, Fund for the Advancement of Education); two industrial corporations (Corning Glass Works and the Arabian American Oil Company); and the Federal Government (for language work and the register of humanists and social scientists). It is now beginning an association with the John Hay Whitney Foundation. No one interested in the humanities and the work of the Council would be satisfied with this range of support, but real progress is being made in increasing the sources of support.

There still remains the difficult problem of piecing the parts together into a reasonably rounded, stable base for the Council's activities. We do not have a properly adjusted financial base for our operations despite the fact that the Board of Directors has developed a clearly formulated program and a sharply defined set of objectives based on years of experience of a type which cannot be duplicated for the humanities anywhere else in the country. The Board of Directors of the ACLS, like other responsible and experienced groups in education and research, is looking hopefully toward the Ford Foundation for support, in the firm belief that the scholars affiliated with the ACLS have a substantial contribution to make in the area marked out by the Foundation. It is, therefore, gratifying to report that the Fund for the Advancement of Education established by the Ford Foundation granted \$90,000 for an emergency addition to the Faculty Study Fellowships, a precedent which we hope will mark the way toward further support for ACLS activities by the Ford Foundation and its associated Funds.

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It is very important for members of the Council and those who look to the ACLS for leadership and help in the advancement of the humanities to know and understand the practical difficulties which confront the Board of Directors. It is to be hoped that the individual learned societies increasingly will give attention to strengthening their ties with the ACLS and to improving their membership's understanding of the benefits derived from a strongly supported ACLS. In proposing to the secretaries of the constituent societies a discussion of this very objective, William R. Parker of the Modern Language Association has written:

"I think most of the constituent societies would readily admit that if the ACLS did not exist, we should have to invent it. The complexities of organized modern society (e.g., the existence of international federations and of the three other national research councils), the disunity of the threatened 'humanities,' the steadily increasing needs for developing new areas for humane studies, the continuing needs for the coordination and interpretation of research in the study of man—these and other factors combine to make the ACLS a unique and indispensable custodian of our broadest common concerns."

The ACLS does not have to be invented. It does exist; and those who do appreciate the services rendered by it should give the Council their moral support and avail themselves of every opportunity to present the case for the maintenance of a strong and effective national humanistic council alongside comparable agencies for the natural and social sciences.

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Despite the financial crippling of the ACLS, the past year has witnessed achievements in which members of the Council can take satisfaction. Many kinds of Council activities are described in the ACLS *Newsletter* and in special reports which will appear in the annual *Bulletin*. I shall not undertake a general review of the Council's program, but I do wish to mention two sets of activities, both which have to do with communications within the scholarly world or between scholars and the educated public.

The first has to do with communication in print, our old companion, the problem of scholarly publishing with which the ACLS has had a long-established pioneering concern. When I came to the Council as Executive Director in the fall of 1948, I found my desk piled high with requests for subsidies for publications in the humanities and social sciences and our coffers empty of funds for such purposes for the first time since 1930. ACLS requests for support for such subsidies had already been denied, and I have yet to recover from the chills received from approaches to sources of funds for help of this kind. Yet the problem remained; it was acute and could be expected to become still more acute. It did not seem consonant with the tradition of responsible action by the ACLS in this sphere to shrug our shoulders and ignore the rising tide of difficulties. In the Board of Directors we recognized that there were still resources throughout the land for scholarly publishing, but previous inadequacy of these resources had led to the program of subsidy to publications, and the rising tide of prices meant that they were becoming still more inadequate. We felt that the primary purpose of scholarly publishing was communication in print and that ensuring the most efficient possible use of existing resources—thus permitting more communication—might be a palliative if by no means a full cure.

It was perfectly clear that we could not hope to make a useful contribution in this direction unless we could obtain the services of a person with a very special combination of characteristics: familiarity with scholarly materials and with scholars themselves, an expert knowledge of the publishing process, the imagination to find ways in which the scholar's handling of his materials might reduce costs, a lively interest in running down every technical development which might offer the possibility of reducing costs, the patience to serve as a constant source of information concerning existing publishing possibilities for scholars who reveal a tendency to regard publishing as a problem which others should care for after the authors have completed a perhaps not

too clean manuscript, and, finally, the courage and the missionary zeal to persuade publishers and scholars to try new methods offering some chance of economy even at the sacrifice of conventional appearances. Henry M. Silver was indicated as *the* man to undertake this publication advisory service and a donor generously underwrote the costs of this activity during the three years from January 1949 to the present.

In all frankness it must be said that an audience which hoped for subsidy was not entirely happy at the beginning with advice, particularly when this advice often involved suggestions requiring changes in habits. A man with less love of mankind and with less zeal for ameliorating the difficulties of scholarly publishing than Henry Silver possesses would have quailed before the discouraging reception which he received on many occasions during the first year of his mission. With stubborn but friendly persistence he continued to meet and talk with all kinds of persons associated with the production and use of journals and books. By 1951 authors, editors, university press directors, publishers, librarians, and readers in universities and colleges across the country knew Henry Silver as a friend and helpful consultant. Many can point to economies which have been effected through his suggestions. It would be too much to assert that his every suggestion is followed, but I have good reason to know that his advice is highly valued. I am especially impressed by evidences of increased friendliness among the various parties to the process of scholarly publication—scholars, editors, publishers—and by signs of greater mutual understanding of the responsibilities each has to the other. I believe that Silver is to be blessed as a peacemaker among these parties.

He is a modest man, and even though it might have appeared to outsiders that he was substituted in 1949 for subsidies which expired in 1948, Silver never so regarded himself. He has always hoped that, as a result of efforts to achieve the most economical form of effective scholarly written communication, foundations might be persuaded again to give subsidies toward the cost of publications which cannot possibly pay their own way but which are of such intrinsic importance as to merit availability in published form. Such subsidies have not yet achieved popularity, and now I must report to you that the Board of Directors has not been able to obtain the funds required to maintain even the publication advisory service beyond 1952. Henry Silver has accordingly resigned from the Council staff as of February 1. We are deeply grateful to the donor who has made possible Silver's three years of creative service to the scholarly world. We lament exceedingly the social loss which comes from our inability to maintain the program in these next years. In recent weeks I have heard from university press directors, printers, librarians, editors of scholarly journals, secretaries of learned societies, and scholars, telling me how highly they value his services and need

his continued advice. It is frustrating to see how much is lost for want of so little financial support. At least we can express our appreciation to Henry Silver for the devoted service he has rendered to scholarly publishing in the United States and our realization of loss in personal and professional terms as he leaves the Council.

The Council maintains a concern with communication in yet another sense, communication between the scholarly disciplines and between scholars and the educated laity. This concern is natural to the ACLS as an interdisciplinary organization among scholars and as a national representative of, and advocate for, humanistic studies. From year to year, and in many ways, the Council seizes, or stimulates, opportunities for the exchange of ideas in the search for greater understanding of human life. I should like to select two recent instances.

In December 1951 plans of the Committee on Musicology bore fruit in a Conference on Music in Contemporary American Civilization, unusual in its scope. Music is an extremely difficult field of bookish study, a fine art the practice of which requires the professional development of highly trained composers and virtuosi, a popular art produced by many music makers, a spontaneous source of enjoyment to countless amateurs, a part of the folkways of the people, and a big business. The approaches to music are legion, and—whatever harmony there may be in the strains of music—a Babel of tongues prevails about it. Yet it is clear that much could be gained from a greater degree of understanding and cooperation among at least some of the parties to our musical life. This conference was an effort to establish a base of common discourse, and while the tenor of the conference at times was clashing and atonal, a larger measure of comprehension of music in its totality was obtained by the participants.

Still more unusual in range was the Conference on Living in Industrial Civilization, held under the joint sponsorship of the ACLS and Corning Glass Works at Corning, New York, May 17-19, 1951. This conference was based on the belief that scholarly concern with value problems of human life has important application in the current scene and that, despite the infrequency of association between scholars and men of affairs, when gathered together under favoring conditions, they can communicate with each other on fundamental problems of our time. The fundamental ideas for the conference itself were developed in discussions of the Board of Directors with Arthur A. Houghton, Jr., member-at-large of the Council. Through Mr. Houghton's initiative, Corning Glass Works underwrote generously the costs of the conference, but the planning of the conference was left without restriction to the responsibility of the ACLS. For this evidence of confidence in the Board's planning of, to say the least, a very unusual venture, the Board is grateful to Mr. Houghton and his associates.

The participants in this conference, drawn from many pursuits in American life, were clearly stimulated to a realization of important problems warranting an intellectual exchange among scholars, businessmen, labor leaders, and public officials, as revealed in an interesting book about the conference entitled, "Creating an Industrial Civilization," to be published by Harper & Brothers in the early spring of 1952. The participants can pursue—and are pursuing—relevant lines of interest through the channels natural to their usual sphere of activity; and the ACLS Board of Directors wishes to assume responsibility for continued activity in its sphere. Subjects related to the problems discussed at Corning will be developed at a conference on "Changes in Systems of Belief in the United States since World War I" to be held this spring under the auspices of our Committee on American Civilization. This program is being organized in such a way as to invite humanists, social scientists, journalists, and other experts to exploit their knowledge for a better understanding of the basic convictions, loyalties, and conflicts in the lives of living Americans.

In addition to providing such opportunities for individuals to exchange ideas across conventional but very real barriers, the Council has sought to provide the means for scholars to have experiences which would extend their range of intellectual development and permit them more readily to participate effectively in such intellectual exchanges. The last year has seen a notable experiment along this line reach a point where a measure of the results may be made. I refer to the Faculty Study Fellowships supported by an imaginative grant from the John and Mary R. Markle Foundation. By the end of 1951 reports had been received from thirteen faculty members from eleven universities or colleges describing their experiences while on Faculty Study Fellowships during 1950-1951 and their evaluation of this experience now that they have returned to their normal duties. I wish that it were possible for all to read these fascinating reports with their large measure of critical analysis of conditions and objectives in the lives of humanistic scholars. Their experience abundantly justifies the financial—and no less important—moral support they received through the award of ACLS Faculty Study Fellowships for this type of intellectual activity. Sixteen awards have been made for 1951-1952, and nominations for awards for 1952-1953 have been received. The original grant made possible a three-year program, and it is greatly to be hoped that the John and Mary R. Markle Foundation will make it possible to continue this highly significant program for another period.

All persons in the educational world remember the chaotic conditions which prevailed in already financially weakened colleges and universities a year ago as their administrations contemplated the effects upon their resources of a serious decline in student enrollment. Though the size of the decline could not be determined in the spring, it was apparent that college

administrators would tend to inflict heavier reductions upon humanists than upon other members of the faculty. In the spring of 1951 the Fund for the Advancement of Education and The Rockefeller Foundation showed great vision and understanding by making available to the ACLS funds for a special series of Faculty Study Fellowships awarded to fourteen humanists on college faculties and funds for awards as ACLS Scholars to thirty-nine highly-selected and competent humanists who were being displaced from college faculties. These two programs complemented each other; and while not meeting all levels of need, they retained in professional activity a substantial number of highly-qualified teachers of the humanities who might otherwise have been driven by temporary but acute economic pressure away from their profession. I emphasize highly-qualified because these awards were made only after rigorous screening, the Board of Directors and the special Committee on Fellowships having every desire to retain for the teaching profession not individuals of marginal ability but promising, imaginative, and very able humanists caught in the backwash of mobilization, who should be retained if at all possible in association with universities and scholarly activity.

I am led to conclude with a reference to the disadvantaged position in which both the humanist and the social scientist are now placed in our society. Quite apart from the very considerable difference in the special opportunities and financial support offered natural scientists as compared with both social scientists and humanists, there have been shaped, and are being shaped, national policies which can easily prevent the maintenance in this country of a truly liberal education and of specialized knowledge in the humanities and social sciences, both of which are essential to the welfare and the security of the nation even during this period of mobilization. There is widespread throughout the United States in circles of considerable influence a myopic view of our national needs which sees only the contribution of the natural sciences and technology to security and which ignores persistently the contributions which could stem from invigorated and encouraged humanists and social scientists. It is imperative that we make every effort to overcome this tendency toward anti-intellectualism with reference to the study of human beings. With no disrespect intended to natural scientists and engineers, we, too, have our own function to perform and our own utility in society. The nation will be much worse off in trying to preserve its security in a dangerous world if it continues to be unaware of the important part the humanities and social sciences have to play in that problem of global human relations which is the true cause of our colossal insecurity.

When the nation a year ago faced important decisions affecting the ability of higher education to make its varied and total contribution to our security in a time of mobilization, the voice of education was strangely con-

fused; and there appeared the prospect of the immolation of our educational structure, a major buttress of our defense, as the consequence of an emotional, shortsighted view of our real problem of defense and security. Too few humanists and social scientists recognized the magnitude of the danger stemming from these limited and inadequate conceptions, and even fewer undertook to present in public forums the defense of the humanities and social sciences as sources of strength in war as well as in peace.

By a tender margin the Selective Service plan which recognizes the breadth of our educational needs for security was adopted for the academic year 1951-1952. There is yet to be determined the provisions which will govern student deferment for 1952-1953, and there are other developments in sight which will affect profoundly the ability of humanists and social scientists to make their unique contribution to the nation. It is imperative now that humanists and social scientists explain to their fellow citizens time and time again the significance of their work to the spiritual strength and the wisdom of the nation in these dangerous circumstances. The nation does not comprehend sufficiently its need for knowledge, and yet more knowledge, about men and human affairs. If we would maintain a vital and valuable humanistic tradition to serve and support men in their present agony, we must not only advance Learning among scholars of man, but we must also persuade the generality of men that they too must cherish Learning, as well as Science, and heed it in the pressing problems which now confront all of us.







